Effects of fictive reward on rat’s choice behavior by Ko-Un Kim et al.
Effects of fictive reward on rat’s choice
behavior
Ko-Un Kim1,3,4, Namjung Huh1,3, Yunsil Jang1,2, Daeyeol Lee5 & Min Whan Jung1,2,3,4
1Center for Synaptic Brain Dysfunctions, Institute for Basic Science, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon
305-701, Korea, 2Department of Biological Sciences, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon 305-701,
Korea, 3Neuroscience Laboratory, Institute for Medical Sciences, Ajou University School of Medicine, Suwon 443-721, Korea,
4Neuroscience Graduate Program, Ajou University School of Medicine, Suwon 443-721, Korea, 5Department of Neurobiology,
Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT 06510, USA.
Choices of humans and non-human primates are influenced by both actually experienced and fictive
outcomes. To test whether this is also the case in rodents, we examined rat’s choice behavior in a binary
choice task in which variable magnitudes of actual and fictive rewards were delivered. We found that the
animal’s choice was significantly influenced by the magnitudes of both actual and fictive rewards in the
previous trial. Amodel-based analysis revealed, however, that the effect of fictive reward wasmore transient
and influenced mostly the choice in the next trial, whereas the effect of actual reward was more sustained,
consistent with incremental learning of action values. Our results suggest that the capacity to modify future
choices based on fictive outcomes might be shared by many different animal species, but fictive outcomes
are less effective than actual outcomes in the incremental value learning system.
F
ictive outcomes refer to rewards or punishments that have been observed or inferred but not directly
experienced. It is well established that human choice behavior is influenced by actual as well as fictive
outcomes1,2. Recent studies have shown that choice behavior in non-human primates is also influenced by
fictive outcomes; monkeys tend to choose a target that was associated with a large fictive reward in the previous
trial3,4. Thus, cognitive capability to compare actual and fictive outcomes and adjust subsequent choice behavior
according to the outcome of the comparison is not unique to human, but also found in other animals.
The capability to adjust future choices according to fictive outcomes would enable an animal to make adaptive
choices in the future without directly experiencing all possible outcomes, and hence would be advantageous for its
survival in many natural settings. One might then expect that this capability would be widespread in the animal
kingdom. On the other hand, adjusting future choices based on the information obtained from both actual and
fictive outcomes might require a highly advanced cognitive capacity, thereby limiting its presence in only some
animals such as primates. Empirical studies using non-primate animals are needed to resolve this matter. In this
regard, a recent study employing a sequential wait-or-skip choice task has shown that, encountering a long-delay
choice after skipping a short-delay choice, rats tended to look backwards toward the foregone option and wait for
the long delay5. Although this study showed potential ‘regret’-induced behavioral changes in rats, it did not
establish that information on fictive reward can be used by rats in an adaptive manner to increase future gain. To
date, the capability to compare actual and fictive rewards and adjust future choices according to the comparison
has been demonstrated unequivocally only in primates.
In the present study, in order to address this issue, we examined effects of actual and fictive rewards on choice
behavior of the rat, which is one of the most widely used experimental animal models. We found that rat’s choice
behavior was influenced by both actual and fictive rewards, but the effect of fictive rewards was more transient
than that of actual reward.
Results
Effects of actual and fictive rewards on choice. Seven rats were tested in a binary choice task (30 trials per
session) inwhich both targets delivered randomly chosenmagnitudes of reward (1, 3 or 5 sucrose pellets). Reward
locations were adjacent and they were divided by a transparent wall containing numerous holes (Fig. 1a).
Moreover, each magnitude of reward was associated with a distinct number of auditory cues (1, 2 and 3 tones
for 1, 3 and 5 sucrose pellets, respectively; Fig. 1b) and fictive reward delivery preceded actual reward delivery
(Fig. 1c) in order to provide plenty of sensory information about the magnitude of fictive reward before actual
reward became available to the animal.
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All animals showed significant biases towards either the left or
right goal (choice bias; binomial test, p , 0.05; mean proportion of
choosing the preferential goal, 72.9 1 5.0%), and four animals
showed significant biases to repeat the same goal choice as in the
previous trial regardless of the magnitudes of actual and fictive
rewards (stay bias; binomial test, p, 0.05; mean proportion of stay,
57.7 6 6.5%). Despite these biases, the animal’s choice was consis-
tently influenced by the magnitudes of fictive as well as actual
rewards in the previous trial. Fig. 2a shows the proportion of stay
trials for each of nine combinations of actual and fictive reward
magnitudes in the previous trial. In general, the animals tended to
repeat the same goal choice as in the previous trial as the magnitude
of actual reward in the previous trial increased and, conversely, as the
magnitude of fictive reward in the previous trial decreased.
When the animal’s choice behavior was analyzed according to the
magnitude of actual reward irrespective of the magnitude of fictive
reward, the proportion of stay trials increased monotonically as a
function of the magnitude of actual reward in the previous trial in all
animals except one (rat #4; Fig. 2b, left). Conversely, the proportion
of stay trials decreased monotonically as a function of the magnitude
of fictive reward in the previous trial in all animals (Fig. 2b, right).
Proportions of stay trials significantly deviated from an even distri-
bution (x2-test, p , 0.05) across different magnitudes of actual
reward in the previous trial in six out of seven animals, and across
different magnitudes of fictive reward in the previous trial in four out
of seven animals.
We then ran a logistic regression analysis to test whether effects of
actual and fictive rewards persist across multiple trials. The animals
tended to repeat the previous goal choice as the magnitude of pre-
vious actual reward increased (actual reward effect of t-1 trial, t-test, p
, 0.05 in all animals and on average), and, conversely, switch goal
choice as the magnitude of previous fictive reward increased (fictive
reward effect of t-1 trial, p , 0.05 in five animals and on average;
Fig. 3). The magnitude of the regression coefficient (i.e., effect size)
for t-1 trial was not significantly different between actual and fictive
rewards (0.428 6 0.088 vs. 0.289 6 0.079; paired t-test, p 5 0.264),
indicating that effect sizes of actual and fictive rewards on the ani-
mal’s choice in the next trial were similar. The animals also tended to
repeat the goal choice made two trials before more often as the
magnitude of actual reward two trials before increased (actual reward
effect of t-2 trial, p , 0.05 in four animals and on average), but the
effect of the magnitude of fictive reward two trials before (fictive
reward effect of t-2 trial) was significant only in two animals and
not on average (Fig. 3). Finally, the animals tended to repeat the goal
choice made three trials beforemore often as themagnitude of fictive
reward three trials before increased (fictive reward effect of t-3 trial, p
, 0.05 in five animals and on average). Note that fictive reward effect
of t-1 trial is in opposite direction from fictive reward effects of t-2
and t-3 trials. Thus, the magnitude of actual, but not fictive, reward
had a consistent influence on the animal’s goal choice over multiple
trials. The regression analysis also revealed significant bias to choose
a particular goal (left vs. right) in all animals, significant effect of the
location of the start box in five animals, and significant effect of the
previous choice in six animals (Table 1).
Learning models of choice behavior. Reinforcement learning (RL)
models can explain humans’ and animals’ choice behavior well in
diverse experimental settings6–8. However, recent studies suggest that
adding an additional process, such as a win-stay-lose-switch
strategy9, a perseveration factor10 or an additional RL term with a
short time constant11, to a simple RL model better accounts for
humans’ and animals’ choice behavior in various experimental
settings. In the present study, therefore, we used a hybrid model
that included a separate term to capture the effect of the reward
magnitude in the most recent trial in addition to the standard
incremental value updating used in a simple RL algorithm. In
Figure 1 | Behavioral task. (a) A top-down view (left) and a three dimensional drawing (right) of the maze. (b) Schematic diagram showing
auditory cues (one, two or three tones; left goal, 1 KHz; right goal, 9 KHz) and associated magnitudes of reward (total one, three or five sucrose pellets,
respectively) delivered at the left and right goals. One sucrose pellet was delivered after the first tone, and two pellets were delivered after each additional
tone for reward magnitude 3 and 5. (c) Temporal sequence of the task. ITI, inter-trial interval.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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addition, the value of chosen goal was increased by a constant
amount in each trial (see Methods) to reflect the run-length-
dependent increase in stay probability seen in the data (Fig. 4). In
summary, the fullmodel included the following terms: effect of actual
reward magnitude on the animal’s choice in the next trial (transient
effect of actual reward), effect of fictive reward magnitude on the
animal’s choice in the next trial (transient effect of fictive reward),
effect of actual reward on the value of chosen goal (sustained effect of
actual reward), effect of fictive reward on the value of unchosen goal
(sustained effect of fictive reward), progressive increase of the value
of chosen goal, stay bias, and choice (left vs. right) bias.We compared
the full model and all possible reduced models, along with the full
model with equal learning rates for actual and fictive rewards and its
reduced models, using AIC and BIC12.
Results of the model comparison are summarized in Table 2, and
mean parameters for the full and some reduced models are shown in
Table 3. According to AIC, the bestmodel for four animals was either
the full model (n 5 1), the full model without stay bias (n 5 2) or the
full model with equal learning rates for actual and fictive rewards (n
5 1). The best model for the remaining three animals was the one
without transient (n5 1) or sustained (n5 2) effect of fictive reward
(with or without choice bias). According to BIC, which penalizes the
use of additional variables more severely than AIC, the hybrid model
without sustained effect of fictive reward and stay bias was the best
model for four animals. The bestmodel for other two animals was the
hybrid model without transient effect of fictive reward instead of
sustained effect of fictive reward, and, for the remaining one animal,
the best model was the one containing only transient effects of actual
and fictive rewards along with choice and stay biases. Thus, AIC
tended to select the model including both transient and sustained
effects of actual and fictive rewards, whereas BIC tended to select the
model without sustained effect of fictive reward as the best model. In
the full model, the learning rate of fictive reward (0.037 6 0.013) was
markedly lower than that of actual reward (0.160 6 0.009; paired t-
Figure 2 | Dependence of the animal’s choice on the magnitudes of actual and fictive rewards. (a) Trials were divided into nine groups according
to the combination of actual and fictive reward magnitudes in the previous trial. The proportion of stay trials is indicated in gray scale. Mean, the
proportion of stay trials was averaged across animals. (b) Trials were divided into three groups according to themagnitude of actual (left) or fictive (right)
reward in the previous trial. Blue circles, proportions of stay trials; red circles, proportions of switch trials. Mean, the proportions of stay and switch trials
were averaged across animals (mean 6 SEM).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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test, p 5 4.6 3 1026). By contrast, transient effects of actual and
fictive rewards were similar (0.477 6 0.108 and 0.322 6 0.085,
respectively; p 5 0.280; Fig. 5). These results indicate that actual
and fictive rewards influenced the animal’s goal choice in the next
trial with similar strengths, but fictive reward had little or only a small
influence on the value of unchosen goal unlike the effect of actual
reward on the value of chosen goal.
To test the stability of choice behavior across sessions (90 for each
animal) we divided the entire behavioral data (90 sessions per ani-
mal) into early (sessions 1–30), middle (sessions 31–60) and late
(sessions 61–90) phases and applied the same analyses to each phase
separately. Similar results were obtained across phases (Fig. 6), indi-
cating that effects of actual and fictive rewards on the animal’s sub-
sequent choices were consistently maintained across sessions.
Discussion
We examined choice behavior of rats in a binary choice task that
revealed the magnitudes of rewards delivered at chosen as well as
unchosen goals. The animals’ choice was systematically influenced
not only by the reward they actually received (actual reward), but also
by the reward they could have obtained had theymade the alternative
choice (fictive reward). A model-based analysis revealed that the
effect of fictive reward was more transient than expected from a
traditional RL algorithm. These results indicate that rodents are
capable of adjusting subsequent choice behavior based on the out-
come of the comparison between actual and fictive rewards, but
fictive reward is much less effective than actual reward in incremen-
tal value learning.
Effects of fictive reward on choice. The animal’s choice was
systematically influenced by the magnitudes of both actual and
fictive rewards. This conclusion was consistently supported by the
analysis examining the proportion of stay trials as a function of actual
and/or fictive reward magnitudes (Fig. 2), a logistic regression
analysis (Fig. 3), and computational modeling (Table 2). It should
be noted that magnitudes of actual and fictive rewards were
determined randomly in the present study. By contrast, in a typical
two-armed bandit task, choosing the target with a higher estimated
value is more likely to yield a higher-value (larger, more probable or
less delayed) reward compared to random target selection. In the
present study, the animal’s choice had no consequence on the
magnitudes of subsequent rewards, which might account for the
observation that variable levels of choice and stay biases were
observed across the animals and that these biases were relatively
large in some animals (Fig. 2 and Table 1). Nevertheless, in all of
our analyses, significant effect of fictive reward was found in the
majority of animals. Moreover, the effect size of fictive reward was
as large as that of actual reward, which is consistent with previous
findings in monkeys4 and humans13. These results indicate that the
effect of fictive reward on rat’s choice behavior was robust.
The outcome of an action (reward or punishment) plays an
important role in modifying animal’s subsequent behavior14.
However, learning can take place in the absence of reinforcement;
Figure 3 | Results of logistic regression analysis. Effects of actual and fictive rewards in the previous three trials on the rat’s current choice were examined
by performing a trial-by-trial analysis of rat’s choices using a logistic regressionmodel. A positive (or negative) coefficient indicates that the animal’s past
and current choices tended to be the same (or different). Error bars, standard errors of the coefficient estimates. The animals tended to repeat the same
goal choice (stay) as the magnitude of the actual reward in the previous trial (t-1) increased (positive coefficients for actual reward for t-1 trials), whereas
they tended to switch their choice as themagnitude of the fictive reward in the previous trial (t-1) increased (negative coefficients for fictive reward for t-1
trials). Mean, regression coefficients were averaged across animals (mean 6 SEM; error bars are too small to see). Filled symbols denote statistical
significance (p , 0.05).
Table 1 | Choice bias, effect of starting location, and effect of the previous choice. Shown are the regression coefficients for choice bias, start
box location, and the previous choice of the logistic regression model. All animals showed significant choice bias (preferential choice of the
left or right target), five animals showed significant effect of the starting location, and six animals showed significant effect of the previous
choice
Rat No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Choice bias Coeff. 0.440 1.743 1.320 0.235 1.846 1.829 0.459
p-value 3.9 3 10220 7.9 3 10265 1.2 3 10252 2.1 3 1027 2.6 3 10252 8.8 3 10250 1.1 3 10221
Start box Coeff. 0.089 20.265 0.163 20.088 20.058 20.066 20.095
p-value 0.044 0.014 0.003 0.046 0.297 0.300 0.031
Choice effect Coeff. 20.597 20.514 20.617 20.599 21.175 20.239 20.707
p-value 1.6 3 1024 2.4 3 1026 0.002 2.0 3 1024 1.7 3 1027 0.327 1.2 3 1025
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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rats are capable of acquiring knowledge about the layout of an envir-
onment without reinforcement and use this information later in an
adaptivemanner15,16. Our finding of rat’s capability of using informa-
tion about fictive reward in deciding which goal to choose in the next
trial (i.e., learning without direct reinforcement) is in line with these
results. More recent studies5,17–19 have found neural activity in the
rodent brain that might be related to vicarious trial-and-error20 and
foregone choice/outcome. Combined with our findings, these results
suggest that rats, as humans and monkeys, have a propensity to
compare actual and fictive outcomes and adjust their subsequent
choice behavior according to the result of the comparison. It would
be advantageous for animals to consider all possible outcomes,
experienced or inexperienced, and choose the best option in many
natural settings. Our results suggest that the propensity to consider
both actual and fictive outcomes and modify choice behavior appro-
priately might be shared bymany different animal species. It remains
to be determined how widespread this capability is in the animal
kingdom.
Differential effects of actual and fictive rewards on value
updating. Both actual and fictive rewards modified the animal’s
next choice and their effect sizes were similar in magnitude.
Although unexpected outcomes influence subsequent choices over
multiple trials by updating value functions in standard RL
algorithms21, such value learning was found only for actual reward,
and not for fictive reward, in the present study. This indicates that the
animals retained the information about both fictive and actual
rewards until making a new choice in the next trial, but this
information was not used effectively in modifying expected reward
magnitude (action value) of the unchosen goal. Previous studies in
humans have found fictive reward prediction error signals in the
brain that were correlated with upcoming choices of the
subjects13,22–25. These findings suggest that the information on
fictive reward can be used to update the value of unchosen action
in humans. Different results from these human studies and ours
might be due to species difference; humans might be able to
change the value of unchosen action based on fictive reward more
efficiently than rodents. However, they might also arise from the
difference in task structures. In the previous human studies,
reward probabilities were correlated across trials so that it was
advantageous for humans to update expected reward probabilities
based on both actual and fictive outcomes. By contrast, in our study,
Figure 4 | Dependence of stay choice on run-length. The probability to stay (Pstay) was plotted as a function of run-length (the number of consecutive
choices of the same goal) for each animal. Each data point was calculated using the choice data across all sessions for a given animal. The lines for
individual animals (Rat #1–7) were determined by logistic regression relating animal’s choice and run-length. The animals tended to repeat the same goal
choice as run-length increased. Mean, Pstay values were averaged across animals (mean 6 SEM; error bars are too small to see for some data points).
Table 2 | Results of model comparison. Shown are AIC (top) and BIC (bottom) values for themodels that best explained choice behavior of at
least one animal. The best model (the smallest AIC or BIC value) for each animal is indicated in bold. Numbers in the parenthesis indicate the
number of parameters for eachmodel (including the inverse temperature). Vact andVfic, sustained effects (value learning) of actual and fictive
rewards, respectively; V, sustained reward effects of the model with equal learning rates for actual and fictive rewards (V 5 Vact 5 Vfic); Tact
and Tfic, transient effects of actual and fictive rewards, respectively; Vq, constant increment of chosen value; bst, stay bias; bL, bias to select the
left goal
AIC of optimal models.
Rat No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Vact,Tact,Vfic,Tfic,Vq,bst,bL [8] 2194 1517 1570 2005 1435 1231 2110
Vact,Tact,Vfic,Tfic,Vq, bL [7] 2184 1513 1572 2001 1431 1228 2112
Vact,Tact,Vfic,Vq, bL [6] 2242 1556 1582 1999 1437 1238 2111
Vact,Tact,Tfic,Vq,bst, bL [7] 2196 1515 1570 2015 1433 1234 2137
Vact,Tact,Tfic,Vq, bL [6] 2184 1513 1573 2017 1431 1232 2153
V,Tact,Tfic,Vq,bst, bL [7] 2184 1513 1572 2001 1431 1228 2112
BIC of optimal models.
Rat No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Vact,Tact,Vfic,Vq, bL [6] 2275 1589 1615 2032 1470 1271 2144
Vact,Tact,Tfic,Vq, bL [6] 2217 1546 1606 2050 1464 1265 2186
Tact,Tfic,bst, bL [4] 2293 1594 1745 2445 1569 1261 2349
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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rewards were always delivered and their magnitudes were
randomized across trials, so that there was no advantage of
keeping track of reward magnitudes. Rats might be able to keep
track of values of unchosen actions as efficiently as those of chosen
actions if doing so is advantageous for maximizing a long-term sum
of rewards, which remains to be tested.
The animals updated the value of chosen goal in the present task,
even though this was not advantageous. Numerous studies in
humans and animals have shown strong tendency to change their
behavior based on experienced reward even when their behavior has
no causal relationship with reward delivery (e.g., refs 26–29). These
results suggest that humans and animals have a strong propensity to
keep track of values based on consequences of their actions. In other
words, it is possible that the neural system supporting an RL-like
process is always used as a default30. On the other hand, fictive
reward, despite its ability to influence next choice behavior, may
not have the same privilege to activate value-learning system as
strongly as actual reward. It is conceivable, for example, that fictive
reward activates primarily cognitive executive control systems, such
as dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in primates31,32 and medial prefron-
tal cortex in rats33–35, whereas actual reward activates an additional
reward/value representation system that supports a simple RL pro-
cess, such as the basal ganglia36, so that actual reward automatically
activates an RL-like process whereas fictive reward contributes to
value learning only when it has a predictive value.
Methods
Subjects. Seven young male Sprague Dawley rats (9–11 weeks old, 300–400 g) were
individually housed in their home cages and handled extensively for 5–9 d with free
access to food and water. They were then gradually food deprived over 7 d so that
their body weights were maintained at 80 , 85% of their ad libitum body weights
throughout the experiments. The colony room was maintained at 12-h light and 12-h
dark cycle (light on: 8 p.m.; light off, 8 a.m.) and behavioral training and testing were
done during the dark phase. All experiments were carried out in accordance with the
regulations and approval of the Ethics Review Committee for Animal
Experimentation of Ajou University School of Medicine and Korea Advanced
Institute of Science and Technology.
Apparatus. The maze was 100 cm long, 16 cm wide, and elevated 30 cm from the
floor (Fig. 1a). It had two start boxes and two goal boxes (30 cm long and 8 cm wide
each) along with a central track (40 cm long and 8 cm wide). There were 2 cm high
walls along the entire track and 35 cm high walls at both ends of themaze. Each of the
starting and goal boxes had a photobeam sensor and a sliding door. The two starting
boxes were separated by a transparent acrylic wall (0.5 cm thick and 35 cm high), and
the two goal boxes were separated by a transparent acrylic wall (0.5 cm thick and
35 cm high) containing 117 holes (diameter, 0.6 cm).
Behavioral task. The animals were tested in a binary choice task. They were allowed
to choose one of two goals freely in each trial (30 trials per session). The same start box
was used throughout a given session, and two start boxes were used alternately across
successive sessions. The door of the unused start box for a given session was kept
closed throughout the session. Each trial began by opening the door of the start box
that contained the animal and the doors of both goal boxes (three operating doors for
a given session). Once the animal arrived at a goal box, the three operating doors were
closed, and food reward was delivered first at the unchosen goal, and then at the
chosen goal. The food reward was one, three or five sucrose pellets (20 mg, Dustless
Precision Pellet, Bio Serv., NJ, USA), which were delivered manually. The food
delivered at the unchosen goal was removed manually before delivering food at the
chosen goal. The magnitude of reward (i.e., the number of food pellets) was
determined randomly and independently for both chosen and unchosen goals in each
trial. Reward locations were adjacent and they were divided by a transparent wall
containing numerous holes in order to facilitate sensory information about the fictive
reward to be available to the animals. Moreover, each magnitude of reward was
associated with a distinct number of auditory tones (1, 2 and 3 tones for 1, 3 and 5
sucrose pellets, respectively; left goal, 1 KHz; right goal, 9 KHz; 0.5 s duration with
0.5 s interval) that preceded each reward delivery (Fig. 1b). Thus, plenty of sensory
information about the magnitude of fictive reward was available to the animals. The
three operating doors were opened,1 s following reward delivery so that the animals
could return to the start box after consuming reward. The three operating doors were
closed as soon as the animal returned to the start box, which concluded a trial
(Fig. 1c). The next trial began after 1 s of inter-trial interval. The animal’s arrival at the
start and goal boxes was detected by four sets of photobeam sensors, and opening and
closing of doors were controlled automatically by a personal computer using LabView
software (National Instruments, TX, USA).
Behavioral training and testing. Following 5–9 d of acclimation to the maze, the
animals went through a shaping period during which each of six auditory stimuli (1, 2
or 3 tones at 1 or 9 KHz) was associated with a given magnitude of reward at the start
box (5–7 d; location of start box alternated across sessions; reward magnitude
randomized across trials; 50–60 daily trials) and then at the goal box (10–14 d;
1 KHz, left goal; 9 KHz, right goal; reward magnitude randomized across trials; the
animals were forced to visit a particular goal by opening the door of a randomly
chosen goal box; 55–80 daily trials). The animals were then trained to choose between
the left and right goals that delivered nine combinations of rewardmagnitudes (left, 1,
3 or 5; right 1, 3 or 5 sucrose pellets; fictive reward was delivered before actual reward
and each reward was preceded by its corresponding auditory stimulus; 10 consecutive
trials for each reward magnitude combination; 90 trials per day; the sequence of
reward combinations was randomized). This step was to further teach the animals
that the auditory cue at the unchosen goal was associated with a particular magnitude
of reward. The animals were trained this way until they made.70% choices of larger
rewards in all unequal combinations (10–14 d of training). They were then tested in
the main task during which actual and fictive reward magnitudes were randomly
determined in each trial (total 90 sessions per animal; 30 trials per session, 2 sessions
per day). The animals were given approximately 10 mg of food (general rat chow)
following each session.
Table 3 | Model parameters. Shown are parameters (mean 6 SEM) of the full and three reduced models (model 1, sustained effect of actual
reward only; model 2, sustained and transient effects of actual reward; model 3, sustained effects of actual and fictive rewards). AIC and BIC
values are also shown. All models included three bias terms [constant increment of chosen value (Vq), stay bias (bst,) and left-choice bias (bL)]
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Full model
aactual 0.227 6 0.086 0.133 6 0.006 0.454 6 0.187 0.160 6 0.009
afictive --- --- 0.312 6 0.173 0.037 6 0.013
kactual --- 0.447 6 0.095 --- 0.461 6 0.097
kfictive --- --- --- 0.323 6 0.090
b 0.501 6 0.051 0.138 6 0.055 0.541 6 0.067 0.076 6 0.037
bst 20.661 6 0.137 21.561 6 0.147 21.780 6 1.067 21.037 6 0.151
bL 0.563 6 0.274 0.485 6 0.214 0.729 6 0.330 0.493 6 0.207
Vq 0.186 6 0.119 0.353 6 0.038 1.459 6 1.129 0.439 6 0.042
AIC 1782 6 136 1751 6 142 1752 6 141 1723 6 142
BIC 1809 6 136 1784 6 142 1784 6 141 1767 6 142
Number of parameters 5 6 6 8
Figure 5 | Sustained and transient effects of actual and fictive rewards.
Shown are learning rates (aactual and afictive; i.e., coefficients for sustained
effects) and coefficients for transient effects (kactual and kfictive) of actual
and fictive rewards of the full model averaged across animals (mean 6
SEM). The asterisk denotes statistical significance (paired t-test, p, 0.05).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Analysis. Stay probability Stay probability, i.e., the proportion of repeating the same
goal choice as in the previous trial, was calculated as a function of actual reward
magnitude and/or fictive rewardmagnitude in order to assess the effects of actual and
fictive reward magnitudes on the animal’s choice in the next trial.
Logistic regression analysis Effects of the animal’s past choices and their outcomes
(up to 3 trials) on the animal’s choice in the current trial were examined using the
following logistic regression model37–39:
log
pL ið Þ
pR ið Þ
 
~
X3
j~1
cRj RL i{jð Þ{RR i{jð Þð Þ{
X3
j~1
cFj FL i{jð Þ{FR i{jð Þð ÞzcC CL i{1ð Þ{CR i{1ð Þð ÞzcSSzc0,
ð1Þ
where pL(i) (or pR(i)) is the probability of selecting the left (or right) goal in the i-th
trial. The variable RL(i) (or RR(i)) is the magnitude of actual reward at the left (or
right) goal, FL(i) (or FR(i)) is the magnitude of fictive reward at the left (or right) goal,
CL(i 2 1) (or CR(i 2 1)) is the left (or right) goal choice (0 or 1) in the (i 2 1)-th trial,
and S is the location of the start box (0 or 1). The coefficients cRj , c
F
j , c
C and cS denote
the effects of past actual rewards, past fictive rewards, the previous choice and start
box location, respectively, and c0 is the bias to choose the left goal (choice bias).
Learning models of choice behavior The probability of selecting the left goal in the (i
1 1)-th trial was fit to the following model:
pL iz1ð Þ~e
DQ ið Þ.
1zeDQ ið Þ
 
, ð2Þ
if CL(i) 5 1 and CR(i) 5 0
DQ ið Þ~b½QL ið Þ{QR ið Þz½kactualRL ið Þ{kfictiveFR ið Þ zbstzbL,
else
DQ ið Þ~b½QL ið Þ{QR ið Þz½kfictiveFL ið Þ{kactualRR ið Þ {bstzbL, ð3Þ
where bst and bL are biases to stay (stay bias) and to select the left goal (choice bias),
respectively, b is the inverse temperature of the soft-max action selection rule, QL(i)
and QR(i) are action value functions of the left and right goal, respectively, in the i-th
trial, and kactual and kfictive are constants. The action value functions were updated as
the following:
if CL(i) 5 1 and CR(i) 5 0
QL ið Þ~QL i{1ð Þzaactual: RL ið Þ{QL i{1ð Þð ÞzVq=b,
QR ið Þ~QR i{1ð Þzaf ictive: FR ið Þ{QR i{1ð Þð Þ,
ð4Þ
else
QL ið Þ~QL i{1ð Þzaf ictive: FL ið Þ{QL i{1ð Þð Þ,
QR ið Þ~QR i{1ð Þzaactual: RR ið Þ{QR i{1ð Þð ÞzVq=b,
ð5Þ
where aactual and afictive are the learning rates for actual and fictive rewards,
respectively, and Vq is a constant increment for the value of chosen goal. In reduced
models, subsets of terms were excluded from the full model.
Figure 6 | Effects of actual and fictive reward magnitudes on the animal’s choice behavior in different phases. The entire behavioral data (90 sessions)
were divided into three phases (early,middle and late) and the same analyses used in Fig. 2–5were applied to each phase. Shown are values averaged across
the animals. (a) Same formats as in Fig. 2. (b) Same formats as in Fig. 3. (c) Same formats as in Fig. 4. (d) Same formats as in Fig. 5.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 5 : 8040 | DOI: 10.1038/srep08040 7
Statistical test. Statistical significance of a regression coefficient was determined with
a t-test (two-tailed). A binomial test was used to determine statistical significance of
the proportion of left-choice or stay trials, and a x2-test was used to test whether the
proportion of stay trials significantly deviated from an even distribution across
different magnitudes of actual or fictive reward in the previous trial. A p value,0.05
was used as the criterion for a significant statistical difference. All data are expressed
as mean 6 SEM.
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